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ROBERT B. THOMPSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
When cases continue to be debated decades after they were 
decided it is usually because of how they changed the law at the 
time of the decision and/or because of what they contribute to 
resolving new legal problems arising in the current period.1  This 
Article uses those two benchmarks to analyze Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.2 and its immediate precedent from the prior 
year, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.3  Looking at these cases in 
the context of the changes to the law at the time they were decided 
(the focus of Part I below), their most lasting impact was not on the 
equal opportunity principle, or de facto dividend regulation, or 
even partnership fiduciary duty rules, but on how they changed the 
dominant legal framework for viewing the closely held firm.  In­
deed the primary change following those cases has been in the legis­
lative and judicial embracing of a greater role for judicial 
involvement as opposed to just leaving parties to their own con­
tracting as the preferred legal response to address the specific pre­
dicament of investors in a closely held firm. 
The particular legal remedy in those cases, an enhanced fiduci­
ary duty among participants in a closely held corporation, is only 
one of five that have developed since then as widely accepted legal 
principles in this area.4  The other four—statutes providing judges 
* Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University. 
1. There are additional reasons, of course, one of which would be the descriptive 
power of the language, for example Meinhard v. Salmon’s “punctilio” standard.  Mein-
hard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). That case probably meets all three 
predictors for longevity. See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Story of Meinhard v. 
Salmon: Fiduciary Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE  LAW  STORIES (J. Mark Ramseyer 
ed. 2009). 
2. See generally Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 
1976). 
3. See generally Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
4. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. R 
369 
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with authority to grant involuntary dissolution for oppressive or 
similar acts in the corporation,5 reasonable expectations as the most 
widely accepted standard to trigger such judicial relief,6 buyout at a 
judicially determined fair price as the preferred remedy for such 
violations,7 and permitting minority owners to sue for breach of fi­
duciary duty in a direct, individual action as opposed to a derivative 
claim8—have each achieved even broader consensus than the en­
hanced fiduciary duty holding of Donahue and Wilkes.9  Together 
the five developments reflect a legislative and judicial recognition 
of the predicament that minority investors find themselves when 
there has been a falling out among the participants in an intimate, 
illiquid enterprise characterized by centralized control and perma­
nence.  They also reflect legislative and judicial recognition that 
contracting alone is an insufficient response to the reality exper­
ienced by such an investor so that the possibility (albeit not the 
guarantee) of judicial relief is a beneficial legal rule to be provided 
by the state. 
Part II explores the extent to which investors in limited liability 
companies (LLCs), a new form of organizing a closely held firm 
that was not available at the time of Donahue and Wilkes, face a 
parallel dilemma.  The intimacy of the relationship in most LLCs 
and the multiple connections of the participants to the business are 
often as true in the LLC as they are in the close corporation.  LLC 
rules have replicated the illiquidity and permanence of the corpora­
tion in a closely held setting.  The menu of possible responses is the 
same, including contracting or judicial relief.  LLC proponents see 
contracting as something fundamentally different in the LLC as op­
posed to the close corporation, but this is a path the law of the 
closely held firm has been down before.  In fact, the LLC con­
tracting debate looks a lot like the close corporations law reform 
discussions of the 1950s and 1960s, before Donahue, when con­
tracting was seen as the preferred solution for the worries of a mi­
5. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (2005). 
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 (West 2004). 
7. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(e). 
8. See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Op­
pression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993). 
9. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 377, 382 (2004) (asserting even the most generous interpretation cannot trans­
form the Massachusetts law of fiduciary duties in close corporations into anything re­
sembling a true majority rule).  However, even fiduciary duty has done better than 
Professor Siegel suggests. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. R 
 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE205.txt unknown Seq: 3 27-SEP-11 9:12 
2011] ALLOCATING THE ROLES	 371 
nority investor in the closely held firm.10  Thus, the guidance of 
Donahue and Wilkes will be relevant as legislatures and courts 
again have to address whether contracting is now better equipped 
to address the limits of bounded rationality and other aspects of the 
human condition such that the judicial involvement provided in the 
five strands of close corporation law reform are no longer necessary 
in the twenty-first century. 
I.	 CHANGING THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CLOSELY HELD 
BUSINESS FIRMS CIRCA 1976 
Donahue and Wilkes were at the center of a fundamental re­
orientation in how American law defines the roles for contracting 
and judges in shaping the governance relationship of participants 
within closely held corporations.  Subpart A begins with a discus­
sion of the traditional corporate attributes that have long defined 
corporations and the problems created for a closely held business in 
such a legal regime.  Subpart B briefly covers possible remedies that 
would be available in such a context including self-help, contractual 
protections, and relief from a judge.  Subpart C addresses the cor­
porate law environment for closely held businesses as it existed at 
the time the cases were brought, how the cases changed the law, 
and how the law developed in the time thereafter.  It turns out that 
the courts’ framing of the problem was more important than the 
particular solution provided in these cases.  What we take away 
from Donahue and Wilkes should be more about the distinctive ap­
proach to the role of contracts and courts and less as to the specific 
remedy. 
A.	 The Predicament of Minority Investors in a Closely Held 
Corporation 
The holdings of Donahue and Wilkes were a judicial recogni­
tion of the disconnect between the traditional corporate attributes, 
found in the statutes and the common law of the fifty states, and the 
realities of a closely held business relationship. The usual corporate 
attributes reflect the needs of a publicly held corporation. For ex­
ample, corporations statutes provide for the separation and special­
ization of function (and the various efficiencies that may come from 
such specialization) among shareholders as the providers of capital, 
officers as the day-to-day managers, and directors as the monitors 
10. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.	 R 
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and ultimate authority in making business decisions.11  The central­
ized control of all corporate powers in the board of directors, the 
core of corporate governance law, permits an efficiency that will be 
most useful to a large, sprawling business enterprise.  Entity perma­
nence, continuing beyond the death or withdrawal of any one par­
ticipant, permits the entity to make long-term plans without having 
to hold capital aside to redeem shares of individual investors. Judi­
cial deference to the private ordering within the corporation and to 
the decisions of the centralized majoritarian bodies, deference most 
visible in the business judgment rule,12 similarly reduces the ability 
of individual investors to interfere with the centralized decisions. 
Free transferability and limited liability permits the development of 
public markets.  In turn, these markets provide a source of liquidity 
from outside the corporate structure that lessens the lock-in effect 
of permanence and provides constraints on the possible excesses of 
centralized control. 
In the context of a closely held business, however, these corpo­
rate norms have markedly different effects because the relationship 
is both intimate and illiquid.  Illustrating the first characteristic, the 
closely held firm is often both a vehicle for investment of the par­
ticipant’s money capital and human capital.  Shareholders in a 
closely held firm often expect to be employed and have a meaning­
ful role in management as well as a return on their investment.13 
Decisions vitally important to participants, such as their employ­
ment, are controlled by the majority shareholders through the 
board.  When harmony between participants disappears, a common 
occurrence given the human condition, those with the levers of con­
trol in the corporation can terminate employment, deny dividends, 
or force the minority out of the business on terms set by the major­
ity.  The harm can be more intense given that in many closely held 
firms, there are familial relationships or other long-term personal 
relationships that are at risk in addition to the investment and em­
ployment relationship.14 
11. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §§ 7.28, 8.01, 8.41 (2005) (describing rights 
of shareholders, directors, and officers). See generally CHARLES R. O’KELLEY & ROB­
ERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND  OTHER  BUSINESS  ASSOCIATIONS, CASE AND 
MATERIALS 153 (6th ed. 2010). 
12. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
13. See, e.g., F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE  CORPORA­
TIONS: LAW AND  PRACTICE § 1.07 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CLOSE  CORPORATIONS: 
LAW AND PRACTICE]. 
14. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 701. R 
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The economic reality of the absence of a public market for the 
entity’s shares deprives investors in the closely held firm of the 
same liquidity and ability to adapt available to investors in a public 
corporation.  The permanence of the corporate form further com­
pounds the dilemma.  Without a job, and in the absence of divi­
dends, the minority shareholder may face an indefinite future with 
no return, financial or otherwise, on the contributions made to the 
enterprise. 
B. The Menu of Possible Responses to Such a Predicament 
The predicament just described arises within a legal entity that 
combines centralized control/majority rule with entity permanence 
and the lack of an exit, so that a minority investor, after a falling 
out, faces the possibility of no money forever (or at least until the 
majority relents, or the minority gives up, or the parties are able to 
reach a resolution among themselves).  There are a variety of possi­
ble responses one might take, or tell others to take, in trying to plan 
so as to not be caught in such a situation.  One approach is to 
choose wisely in co-venturers.  Another would be to work harder at 
relationships, to keep small squabbles from festering and growing. 
Such approaches have always been necessary in general partner­
ships given the unlimited liability that can arise from actions of 
one’s partners and the practical loss to all partners that can occur 
when intimate relationships in a small enterprise break down. 
A second set of ex ante steps would be to structure the rela­
tionship so both parties would have sufficient incentives to work for 
the common good and not pursue opportunistic conduct. This is 
most easily done in a 50/50 venture or where both parties have sep­
arate inputs that the enterprise needs.  When buying a minority po­
sition, the task becomes more difficult, but the Delaware Supreme 
Court has pointed to “tools of good corporate practice” by which 
minority shareholders “may enter into definitive . . . agreements” 
that “may provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out provisions, 
voting trusts or other voting agreements.”15  Such contracting has 
long been part of the planning that practitioners undertake in the 
close corporation relationship. 
Beyond such self-help, participants could look to other dispute 
resolution devices, such as family ties or by appealing to the norms 
15. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993). 
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of groups to which the co-venturers belong.16  Dispute resolution 
could also be specified by contracts (including e.g. arbitration or 
automatic dissolution) or could be provided by the state by author­
izing a judge to put limits on permanence via an ordering of invol­
untary dissolution or finding a breach of fiduciary duty.17 
One other response might be termed the Henny Youngman so­
lution, reflecting one of the stand-up comedian’s recurring one lin­
ers set up by a patient complaining to the doctor of a particular 
pain, and the doctor’s simple advice: “Then don’t do that!”18  In a 
similar vein, would a savvy investor avoid a legal entity that pro­
duces such results in favor of one such as a partnership, which pro­
vides for shared governance, relatively easy exit, and a judicially-
enforced fiduciary duty?  Why then would any non-majority inves­
tor choose to do business in the corporate form? The answer is that 
the choice of business form has been made in the context in which 
three separate decisions are bundled.  When selecting a business 
form one simultaneously gets a liability rule as to non-participants, 
a tax status as to the government, and a governance relationship 
among co-venturers. 
Participants are not indifferent to what they want from a busi­
ness form—the magic answers to the three relationships in the bun­
dle are limited liability as to outsiders, the lowest taxes as to the 
government, and usually some sort of shared governance as to the 
relationship with co-venturers.19  At the time of Donahue/Wilkes, 
and as had been true for most of the twentieth century until that 
point, the corporation was the dominant business form to provide 
limited liability and still provide a lower tax bill.20  Since the corpo­
16. See, for example, the law merchant discussed in HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. 
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 15 (3d ed. 1983). 
17. See infra notes 80-103 and accompanying text. R 
18. Henny Youngman Jokes: Doctor Jokes, FUNNY2.COM, http://www.funny2. 
com/henny.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). 
19. See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of the Limited Liability Companies, 66 
U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 925 (1995). 
20. Until 1982, the highest individual tax rate always exceeded the highest corpo­
rate tax rate. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 299-305 (5th ed. 1987). 
For example, in 1942, the highest individual rate was 88% while the rate in the top 
corporate bracket was 40%. Id. at 313, 321.  This created an incentive to use the corpo­
rate form if a double tax could be avoided when the corporate earnings were distributed 
to participants and if other tax provisions (for example, basis rules, deductions, exemp­
tions) did not eliminate the advantage from the rate differential.  Other business forms 
such as the Massachusetts Business Trust could possibly provide the combination de­
pending on the state’s approach to limited liability. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 8(a) 
(repealed 2008). 
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rate rate had long been lower than the individual rate an owner 
could retain within the corporate treasury any income produced by 
the business that was not needed by the participants’ immediate 
needs, pay the lower corporate income tax rate, and, if you did your 
planning correctly, eventually get the remaining sums out of the 
corporation without paying a second corporate level tax by coming 
under the General Utilities doctrine.21 
These two immediate benefits, lower taxes and avoiding liabil­
ity to outsiders, dominated the third (governance) area of inquiry. 
Academics and lawyers, as discussed below, focused on the power 
of contracts to address any adjustments that needed to be made in 
the relations among co-venturers, including adjusting rules as to 
centralized control, majority rule, and permanence.22  But parties 
were not always sure they wanted to spend money (that otherwise 
could be used to build the nascent business) to engage in elaborate 
planning.  Like couples contemplating marriage, parties entering 
into a closely held business relationship failed to adequately plan 
for what would happen if they had a falling out.  As with marriage, 
even raising the issue could adversely impinge on the trust thought 
necessary to make the relationship work. 
C.	 Viewing 1975/1976 as a Fulcrum in Corporate Law’s 
Approach to the Closely Held Firm 
A more particular view of the world of close corporations at 
the time of the Donahue and Wilkes decision in 1975 and 1976 is 
also a necessary foundation for understanding the changes the cases 
brought about.  For most of the history of American corporate law 
up until that time, statutes and judicial decisions laid down the same 
rule for governance of both publicly-held and close corporations.23 
In the period after World War II,24 scholars such as F. Hodge 
21. Under the General Utilities doctrine, the corporation’s distribution of appre­
ciated property to its shareholders did not cause the corporation to realize taxable gain, 
thus avoiding a tax at the corporate level. See General Utils. & Operating Co. v. 
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) (1954). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
§ 631 eliminated the General Utilities doctrine.  Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 631, 26 
U.S.C. § 337 (2006).  To avoid a tax at the individual level it was common to zero out 
corporate income by paying out salaries. See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of the 
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 929-30 (1995). 
22.	 See infra note 104. R 
23.	 F. HODGE O’NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 27 (1958). 
24. There was some earlier writing. See generally Norman Winer, Proposing a 
New York “Close Corporation Law”, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943). 
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O’Neal,25 Elvin Latty,26 George Hornstein,27 and Carlos Israels28 
described the differences between public and close corporations 
and urged changes in the law.  Many of these early efforts were 
devoted to gaining increased room for contracting for participants 
in close corporations to avoid the unwanted rules that made the 
public corporation form worrisome.29  Thus, statutes permitted 
charter or bylaw provisions providing unanimity or supermajority 
requirements that provided participants a veto over corporate ac­
tion.30  Other statutory changes loosened formalities31 and provided 
for charter provisions that permitted dissolution at will.32  Scholars 
and legislators of this period expressed belief in contracting similar 
to that expressed by the modern day proponents of LLCs.33  In the 
decade before Donahue and Wilkes, many states had passed special 
statutes dealing with the close corporation that again were focused 
on broadened freedom of contracting.34  The first two editions of 
O’Neal’s landmark Close Corporations treatise, which had been 
published prior to the Massachusetts decisions, focused on agree­
ments that would navigate around unwanted public corporation 
25. O’Neal was dean at three law schools—Mercer, Duke, and Washington Uni­
versity—and also taught at Vanderbilt and the University of Mississippi. F. Hodge 
O’Neal, 73, Ex-Law School Dean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1991/01/24/obituaries/f-hodge-o-neal-73-ex-law-school-dean.html. 
26. Latty was dean at Duke Law School and was an important figure in the draft­
ing of the North Carolina corporations law changes in 1956, a key statutory change in 
the 1950’s. See E.R. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Busi­
ness Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REV. 432, 438 (1956). 
27. See generally George Hornstein, Stockholders’ Agreements in the Closely Held 
Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1951). 
28. See generally Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 COR­
NELL L.Q. 488 (1948). 
29. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 238 (N.Y. 1934) (refusing to 
enforce a contract that interfered with the unfettered discretion of directors to run the 
corporation). 
30. N.Y. STOCK  CORP. LAW §§ 1, 9 (1948) (adding section 9 authorizing charter 
provisions establishing a high quorum or vote requirement). 
31. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S 
CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND  PRACTICE § 1:18 (Rev. 3d ed., 2010) 
[hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS] (discussing 
statute). 
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1973) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14­
30(2) (2009)). 
33. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, Ribstein and Keatinge on 
Limited Liability Companies § 1.2, at 2 (1998); Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, 
Delaware Limited Liability Companies, in DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSI­
NESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.4 (R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., 1998); see 
also infra note 129 and accompanying text. R 
34. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 
31, §§ 1:15-1:19. R 
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characteristics and suggested changes in law to permit such 
actions.35 
Another O’Neal project of this period had categorized the vo­
luminous ways that a minority shareholder could be oppressed or 
squeezed out in a closely held firm. This initial Oppression/Squeeze 
Out volume, published in 1961, included dozens of sections itemiz­
ing the causes of squeeze outs and then two more chapters describ­
ing the techniques used to squeeze out before detailing methods to 
avoid squeeze out and ideas for changes in legal rules.36  This was a 
“Brandeis brief” spelling out the close corporation predicament and 
it spread through O’Neal’s other works. The 260-page paperback 
published in 1961 tripled by the time it was published in hardback 
in 1975.37  Key ideas were incorporated as part of the close corpora­
tion treatise.38  As a regular practice O’Neal wrote to the lawyers in 
every published close corporation and oppression case; thus, it is 
not surprising that he wrote and talked to Mr. Egan, the lawyer for 
Mr. Wilkes.39 
But even here, the focus was on contracts and other arrange­
ments to avoid squeeze outs, and legislative changes that would 
permit such planning.  There had been involuntary dissolution stat­
utes based on oppression since the early 1930s40 and such a provi­
sion had been included in the Model Business Corporation Act 
from the earliest inception of that project in the 1940s.41  The first 
edition of the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, pub­
lished in 1960, reports fourteen states with statutes that authorized 
35. See generally F. HODGE O’NEAL, supra note 23; F. HODGE O’NEAL, CLOSE R 
CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS: 
LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972)]. 
36. F. HODGE O’NEAL & JORDAN DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSI­
NESS ASSOCIATES: SQUEEZE-OUTS IN SMALL ENTERPRISES, ch. 3-5 (1961) [hereinafter 
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES]. 
37. See generally F. HODGE O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF  MINORITY  SHARE­
HOLDERS  EXPULSION OR  OPPRESSION OF  BUSINESS  ASSOCIATES (1975) [hereinafter 
“SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS]. 
38. F. HODGE O’NEAL, supra note 23; CLOSE  CORPORATIONS: LAW AND  PRAC- R 
TICE (2d ed. 1972), supra note 35. R 
39. Interview with Jack Egan, son of David Egan, in Springfield, Mass. (Oct. 15, 
2010). 
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 308, § 351 (1933); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 364, 429 
(1933).  California had a similar law from 1931 to 1933. See Henry W. Ballentine, A 
Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 392 
(1934). 
41. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 
BUS. LAW. 699, 709 n. 68 (1993) (reporting early history). 
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courts to order involuntary dissolution for oppression,42 and by the 
time of the second edition—a decade or so later—the number of 
states had grown to twenty-four.43  That number, however, over­
states the reach of the remedy.  Any relief required a judicial order 
and most judges still felt that killing a corporation was not some­
thing they should do.44  Oppression was not defined in the statute 
and courts were not ready to give it a broad reach. Baker v. Com­
mercial Body Builders, an early Oregon decision, outlined a long 
list of possible remedies under the Oregon statute, but its definition 
of oppression, viewed from a twenty-first century perspective, looks 
narrow.45 
Case precedent at the time was stronger from abroad than 
from the United States.  The United Kingdom had enacted an op­
pression remedy in 194846 and there were some early cases that pro­
vided for broader interpretations of relief and remedies.47  Allen 
Afterman, an Australian scholar writing in an American law review, 
linked oppression in the United Kingdom and other commonwealth 
statutes to conduct that frustrated participants’ reasonable expecta­
42. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 90 (1st ed. 1960) (listing six states with laws sub­
stantially similar to the Model Act’s provisions, two as basically similar, four using “un­
fairness” to the minority, and three closely resembling, one of which was also included 
in the prior category). 
43. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 97 (2d ed. 1969) (listing seven states with identical 
laws or at least laws  identical in substance; thirteen with comparable laws (one of which 
omits oppression and is excluded from this count); three substantially similar to oppres­
sion; and two phrased as when necessary to protect the rights of a substantial number of 
shareholders). 
44. See, for example, cases from states with seemingly broad statutes, Bator v. 
United Sausage Co., 81 A.2d 442, 444 (Conn. 1951) (“Dissension . . . not a ground for 
dissolution unless it goes so far as to render it impossible to carry on the corporate 
affairs.” (citing Olechny v. Thadeus Kosciuszko Soc’y, 24 A.2d 249 (1942))); Polikoff v. 
Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (“[T]he remedy of 
[dissolution] is so drastic that it must be invoked with extreme caution.”). 
45. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393-95 (Or. 1973) 
(defining oppression by reference to a visible departure from the standards of fair deal­
ing, but including no specific reference to reasonable expectations and other terms that 
have become more common since). 
46. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210 (Eng). 
47. See, e.g., Meyer v. Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society, [1958] S.C. 3 (H.L.) 66 
(appeal taken from Scot.) (providing relief to a minority shareholder under section 
210); In re H.R. Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 3 A.L. 689 (appeal taken from Scot.) (finding 
relief under section 210 where father’s behavior oppressive); Ebrahimi v. Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd., [1972] A.C. 2 (H.L.) 1289 (appeal taken from Eng.) (permitting winding 
up under section 222;  permitting relief based on broad grounds based on the partici­
pants overall relationship in the company). 
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tions, heralding what has become a dominant trend in American 
case law.48 
Fiduciary duty, likewise, was a possible source of relief, but one 
that minority shareholders could not regularly rely on in a squeeze-
out setting and one that reform advocates had not chosen to make 
their primary argument.  O’Neal wrote in 1958, in the first edition 
of his close corporations treatise, that there was support for using 
fiduciary duty: “many of the older decisions and practically all of 
the recent ones indicate that controlling shareholders, in some cir­
cumstances at least, owe fiduciary duties to minority sharehold­
ers.”49  He repeated that same statement in new versions of the 
Close Corporation and Oppression treatises in 1972 and 1975 ad­
ding additional case illustrations.50  In the Oppression treatises, he 
summarized the impact this way: 
In spite of the principles of majority rule and the business judg­
ment rule, the courts in this country are moving steadily, though 
slowly and often clumsily and gropingly, to provide a remedy for 
oppressed minority shareholders.  This they are doing principally 
by imposing a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders and cor­
porate directors for the benefit of minority interests, and by grad­
ually expanding the scope of that fiduciary duty.51 
A principal reason for all those adverb qualifiers in the last 
O’Neal description was judicial deference to business decisions. 
O’Neal described it as a too eager willingness to invoke the busi­
ness judgment rule.52  This, in turn, arose from the ambiguity as to 
fiduciary duty in the closely held firm; if there were no fiduciary 
duty in a particular context, there would be no judicial involvement. 
One prominent article of the period observed that 
[I]t is clear that controlling shareholders are not fiduciaries in the 
strict sense; and indeed they could not be, for the classic fiduciary 
concept is incompatible with the principle that the stockholder 
majorities shall effectively govern.  However, the vocabulary and 
48. See generally Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority 
Shareholders: A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969). 
49. CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 13, at 108. R 
50. CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972), supra note 35, at R 
45; “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 37, at 508. R 
51. EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS  ASSOCIATES, supra note 36, § 8.02 R 
at 194; “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 37, at 584. R 
52. Id. § 8.02, at 192, 194 (calling for judicial discrimination in applying the busi­
ness judgment rule in close corporations). 
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some of the content of the law of fiduciaries are employed to deal 
with instances of oppression.53 
An important close corporation symposium of the period 
noted that “[t]he application of the term ‘fiduciary’ to the majority’s 
duty towards the minority is of little value because of the difficulty 
of reconciling the majority’s trust obligation with his right of selfish 
ownership.”54  Here is the governor on unregulated application of 
fiduciary duty and the antecedent for Wilkes use of the “selfish 
ownership” concept to address the same conflict. 
What Donahue and Wilkes did was link the close corporation 
predicament to a fiduciary duty remedy that was more likely to be 
employed in a close corporation setting without the same uncer­
tainty of the prior case law.  They broke through the deference of 
the business judgment rule in the same way that the Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co. decision did a decade later in the takeover 
context.55  There defensive tactics taken by a target board in the 
face of a takeover did not evidence the obvious self-dealing (such as 
directors on the opposite side of a transaction from the corpora­
tion) that would deny the directors the presumption of the business 
judgment defense.  Prior cases56 required the “plaintiff [to] . . . show 
. . . that impermissible motives predominated in the making of the 
decision in question.”57  Yet because of what the Unocal court 
termed the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting prima­
rily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation” in 
taking such actions, it prescribed an enhanced duty that required 
additional judicial review (of the threat and the proportionality of 
the defense) before the business judgment presumption was ap­
plied.58  For similar reasons (and a decade before Unocal) the Mas­
sachusetts courts conclude that existing law would lead to 
invocation of the business judgment rule too quickly and therefore 
impose their own enhanced review. 
That breakthrough was informed by the court’s clear under­
standing of the plight of the minority investor as previously dis­
53. Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986, 1014-15 
(1957) (“Actually the so-called fiduciary rule of the insiders is invoked by the courts 
when selfishly motivated conduct exceeds certain bounds of fairness, as when the cor­
poration is overcharged for property or services, or minority stockholders are frozen 
out of the enterprise . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
54. Symposium, Close Corporation, 52 NW. U.L. REV. 345, 396 (1957). 
55. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
56. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980). 
57. Id. at 292. 
58. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951. 
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cussed.  First, the court acknowledged majority control that is the 
reality of the corporate form and the unlikelihood of being able to 
challenge such conduct under the fiduciary limits just described.59 
Second, the court recognized the intimacy and illiquidity of the mi­
nority’s investment and the vulnerability that resulted from that.60 
The combination is what the court called a trap, and what has been 
referred to here as the predicament of a minority owner.61 
The facts of Donahue are not the most severe example of the 
plight just described, viewed within the context set out in the 
59. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975). 
[T]he power of the board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare or 
withhold dividends and to deny the minority employment is easily converted 
to a device to disadvantage minority stockholders. 
The minority can, of course, initiate suit against the majority and their 
directors.  Self-serving conduct by directors is proscribed by the director’s fi­
duciary obligation to the corporation.  However, in practice, the plaintiff will 
find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies.  Such policies 
are considered to be within the judgment of the directors. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
60. Id. at 514-15. 
Thus, when these types of “freeze-outs” are attempted by the majority 
stockholders, the minority stockholders, cut off from all corporation-related 
revenues, must either suffer their losses or seek a buyer for their shares.  Many 
minority stockholders will be unwilling or unable to wait for an alteration in 
majority policy.  Typically, the minority stockholder in a close corporation has 
a substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation. 
The stockholder may have anticipated that his salary from his position with 
the corporation would be his livelihood.  Thus, he cannot afford to wait pas­
sively.  He must liquidate his investment in the close corporation in order to 
reinvest the funds in income-producing enterprises. 
At this point, the true plight of the minority stockholder in a close corpo­
ration becomes manifest.  He cannot easily reclaim his capital.  In a large pub­
lic corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could sell his 
stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital.  By definition, this 
market is not available for shares in the close corporation . . . . 
The minority stockholder, by definition lacking fifty per cent of the corpo­
rate shares, can never “authorize” the corporation to file a petition for dissolu­
tion under G.L. c. 156B, § 99(a), by his own vote.  He will seldom have at his 
disposal the requisite favorable provision in the articles of organization. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
61. Id. at 515. 
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may be trapped in 
a disadvantageous situation.  No outsider would knowingly assume the posi­
tion of the disadvantaged minority.  The outsider would have the same diffi­
culties.  To cut losses, the minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with 
the majority.  This is the capstone of the majority plan.  Majority “freeze-out” 
schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to re­
linquish stock at inadequate prices.  When the minority stockholder agrees to 
sell out at less than fair value, the majority has won. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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O’Neal treatises, but it does show a minority shareholder left with 
no liquidity at a time that the majority shareholder used company 
funds to provide such liquidity for himself.62  The president (Rodd) 
and the plant superintendent (Donahue) had in effect purchased 
the company where they had each been working for the prior two 
decades.63  Rodd was clearly the more central of the two.  He 
owned 80% of the company’s 200 shares and was the dominant 
force at the company, even mortgaging his house to provide for 
cash for company expenditures.  The two continued to lead the 
company for the next nine years when they each gave way to two 
sons of Rodd who became respectively president and plant superin­
tendent.  The problem that was litigated arose five years later when 
Rodd retired from the board and as treasurer and company funds 
were used to repurchase the remaining forty-five of his shares that 
he had not previously given to his children. There is no indication 
that Donahue had been fired or anything other than normal retire­
ment, but nevertheless he and his wife had no liquidity for their 
stock.  After the corporation’s use of corporate funds to pay Rodd, 
Donahue and his wife sought the same $800 per share price for 
their twenty shares (in contrast to the price they had been offered 
during the previous four years from $40 to $200 per share).64 
The facts in Wilkes possessed more of the characteristics of the 
plight described by O’Neal and by the court in Donahue.65  There, 
four acquaintances acquired land and established a nursing home, 
an enterprise that quickly proved profitable for all participants.  Af­
ter thirteen years, the plaintiff, Wilkes, challenged the sale of a por­
tion of the corporation’s property to Quinn, another of the original 
four investors and the informal managing director.  As a result, 
Quinn ended up paying more for the property, the relationship be­
tween Quinn and Wilkes began to deteriorate, Wilkes’s salary was 
eliminated, and the others declined to reelect him as a director. 
Again the court, (four of the five members having also joined the 
Donahue decision) defined the issue in terms of the position of a 
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation.66  The Court 
62. Id. at 508-11. 
63. Id. at 509-11.  The remainder of the facts in this paragraph are taken from the 
court’s description on pages 509-11. 
64. Id. at 511. 
65. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-63 (Mass. 
1976).  The remainder of the facts in this paragraph are taken from the court’s descrip­
tion on pages 659-63. 
66. Id. at 662-63. 
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recognized the illiquidity of the minority’s investment and the vari­
ous ways that control can be misused beyond the equal opportunity 
context in Donahue, each of which would be met by the same re­
frain of judicial deference to the legitimate sphere of the controlling 
directors.67  As in Donahue, the court noted the intimacy and multi­
faceted nature of the participants’ relation to the enterprise and 
tied it to the investors’ expectations in entering into the venture.68 
The instrument used by the court in both cases to provide relief 
for minority shareholders frozen out of a closely held corporation 
was an enhanced fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty, 
expanded in Wilkes to include consideration of the majority’s right 
67.	 Id. at 662. 
In the Donahue case we recognized that one peculiar aspect of close cor­
porations was the opportunity afforded to majority stockholders to oppress, 
disadvantage or “freeze out” minority stockholders.  In Donahue itself, for 
example, the majority refused the minority an equal opportunity to sell a rata­
ble number of shares to the corporation at the same price available to the 
majority.  The net result of this refusal, we said, was that the minority could be 
forced to “sell out at less than fair value,” since there is by definition no ready 
market for minority stock in a close corporation. 
“Freeze outs,” however, may be accomplished by the use of other devices. 
One such device which has proved to be particularly effective in accomplishing 
the purpose of the majority is to deprive minority stockholders of corporate 
offices and of employment with the corporation. This “freeze out” technique 
has been successful because courts fairly consistently have been disinclined to 
interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the selection 
and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees, which essen­
tially involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority con­
trol. As one authoritative source has said, “[M]any courts apparently feel that 
there is a legitimate sphere in which the controlling [directors or] shareholders 
can act in their own interest even if the minority suffers.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
68.	 Id. at 662-663. 
The denial of employment to the minority at the hands of the majority is 
especially pernicious in some instances.  A guaranty of employment with the 
corporation may have been one of the “basic reason[s] why a minority owner 
has invested capital in the firm.” The minority stockholder typically depends 
on his salary as the principal return on his investment, since the “earnings of a 
close corporation . . . are distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and 
retirement benefits.”  Other noneconomic interests of the minority stock­
holder are likewise injuriously affected by barring him from corporate office. 
Such action severely restricts his participation in the management of the enter­
prise, and he is relegated to enjoying those benefits incident to his status as a 
stockholder.  In sum, by terminating a minority stockholder’s employment or 
by severing him from a position as an officer or director, the majority effec­
tively frustrates the minority stockholder’s purposes in entering into the cor­
porate venture and also deny him an equal return on his investment. 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
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of selfish ownership.69  As a result, Wilkes received the salary he 
would have received had he remained an officer and director.70 
There is a remarkable similarity in the approach of the Massa­
chusetts courts in these two cases and that of the New York Court 
of Appeals—a few years later—in holding that judicial relief was 
appropriate to a minority investor under that state’s involuntary 
dissolution statute.  The New York high court anchored its interpre­
tation of the statute on the characteristics of the close corpora­
tion.71 Moreover, the court properly understood the intimate and 
multifaceted relationship that often characterizes the participants’ 
relationship in the closely held enterprise.72  And as with the prior 
cases and previous academic writing, we see the recognition of the 
impact of statutory norms in creating the risk of oppression.73 
69. Id. at 663. 
70. Id. at 665. 
71. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Gardstein, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984). 
The statutory concept of “oppressive actions” can, perhaps, best be un­
derstood by examining the characteristics of close corporations and the Legis­
lature’s general purpose in creating this involuntary-dissolution statute.  It is
 
widely understood that, in addition to supplying capital to a contemplated or
 
ongoing enterprise and expecting a fair and equal return, parties comprising
 
the ownership of a close corporation may expect to be actively involved in its
 
management and operation.
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
72. Id. 
As a leading commentator in the field has observed: “Unlike the typical
 
shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who may be simply an investor or a
 
speculator and cares nothing for the responsibilities of management, the
 
shareholder in a close corporation is a co-owner of the business and wants the
 
privileges and powers that go with ownership.  His participation in that partic­
ular corporation is often his principal or sole source of income.  As a matter of
 
fact, providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason
 
why he participated in organizing the corporation.  He may or may not antici­
pate an ultimate profit from the sale of his interest, but he normally draws
 
very little from the corporation as dividends.  In his capacity as an officer or
 
employee of the corporation, he looks to his salary for the principal return on
 
his capital investment, because earnings of a close corporation, as is well
 
known, are distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement
 
benefits.”
 
Id. (quoting CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1972), supra note 35, R 
at 21-22). 
73. Id. at 1178-79. 
Shareholders enjoy flexibility in memorializing these expectations
 
through agreements setting forth each party’s rights and obligations in corpo­
rate governance.  In the absence of such an agreement, however, ultimate de-

cision-making power respecting corporate policy will be reposed in the holders
 
of a majority interest in the corporation (see, e.g., Business Corporation Law,
 
§§ 614, 708).  A wielding of this power by any group controlling a corporation
 
may serve to destroy a stockholder’s vital interests and expectations.
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Again, the court notes the impact of illiquidity in contrast to an 
investment in a public corporation;74 and as an addition to the prior 
analysis, the New York court adopted what at the time had been a 
relatively recent move to using reasonable expectations to measure 
whether there was sufficient cause for judicial intervention.75 
After Donahue and Wilkes, and particularly in the decade fol­
lowing Kemp & Beatley, the pace of legislative and judicial protec­
tion for minority shareholders increased dramatically. The focus on 
contracting that had dominated the 1950s and 1960s gave way to 
judicial action.  Among the fifty states, there were parallel develop­
ments providing for judicial action via fiduciary duty and by means 
of a court granting relief under an equity-sounding oppression stat­
ute.76  The result is that there have been five distinct movements of 
the law toward providing broader relief for minority investors in a 
close corporation.  The enhanced fiduciary duty of Wilkes and Don­
ahue may be the least used, depending upon how you count, but the 
larger point is that in most states the five doctrines are complimen­
tary and each reflects the same source—the close corporation pre-
Id. (citation omitted). 
74.	 Id. at 1179. 
As the stock of closely held corporations generally is not readily salable, a 
minority shareholder at odds with management policies may be without either 
a voice in protecting his or her interests or any reasonable means of withdraw­
ing his or her investment.  This predicament may fairly be considered the legis­
lative concern underlying the provision at issue in this case; inclusion of the 
criteria that the corporation’s stock not be traded on securities markets and 
that the complaining shareholder be subject to oppressive actions supports this 
conclusion. 
Id. 
75.	 Id. 
Defining oppressive conduct as distinct from illegality in the present con­
text has been considered in other forums. The question has been resolved by 
considering oppressive actions to refer to conduct that substantially defeats 
the “reasonable expectations” held by minority shareholders in committing 
their capital to the particular enterprise. This concept is consistent with the 
apparent purpose underlying the provision under review.  A shareholder who 
reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or 
her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, 
or some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when 
others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no 
effective means of salvaging the investment. 
Given the nature of close corporations and the remedial purpose of the 
statute, this court holds that utilizing a complaining shareholder’s “reasonable 
expectations” as a means of identifying and measuring conduct alleged to be 
oppressive is appropriate. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
76.	 Thompson, supra note 8, at 704. 
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dicament recognized in Wilkes and Donahue.  The five 
developments include: 
(1) Authorizing a court to cabin entity permanence in contexts 
where there has been a showing of oppressive or similar behavior 
by the majority.  All but eleven states now provide such a way 
around corporate permanence if there has been oppression or con­
duct by the majority that is unfairly prejudicial to the minority.77 
Courts in several states echo the New York court’s finding that 
these statutes were designed by the legislature to provide additional 
remedies for minority shareholders beyond those previously pro­
vided.78  And unlike the period prior to Donahue, these statutes 
have been widely used to provide relief to minority shareholders. 
Even in the states that do not have an oppression statute, there is 
little evidence of opposition to providing a judicial way out of per­
manence.79  Delaware and a few other states are outliers as to this 
trend, but Delaware ought to be considered a special case, given 
that any special rules for close corporations have the potential to 
create uncertainty among public corporations that provide a signifi­
cant share of the Delaware state revenues.80 
(2) In half of the states, courts or legislatures have, like New 
York, used “reasonable expectations” to define oppression, a con­
cept that looks to the context as described in Donahue, Wilkes, and 
Kemp & Beatley.  In some states this standard or something similar 
77. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S 
OPPRESSION OF  MINORITY  SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 7.11 (Rev. 2d ed. 
2009) [hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
AND LLC MEMBER]. 
78. See McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 155 (Utah 2009) (“[T]he legislature 
intended to protect shareholders from oppression and misconduct by those in control. 
To construe the Act’s provisions to require the same fiduciary duty for publicly held 
and closely held shareholders would not adequately protect close corporation share­
holders.”); Fulton v. Callahan, 621 So. 2d 1235, 1252 (Ala. 1993) (noting that inclusion 
of oppression reflected “the legislative extension of the remedy to do more than just 
protect or rescue the underlying assets of the corporation from willfully destructive 
conduct of controlling shareholders”). 
79. See, e.g., G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 243 (Ind. 2001) 
(noting that oppression was intentionally deleted from the code because of concern that 
it might be abused in a hostile takeover, a reason not relevant in the context of a close 
corporation); Jerry Cohen & Jonathan C. Guest, The New Massachusetts Business Cor­
poration Act, Chapter 127 Acts of 2003, 88 MASS. L. REV. 213, 213 (2004) (noting that to 
facilitate legislative adoption of the new business corporation act required non-distur­
bance of Donahue and its progeny and the state’s anti-takeover statutes). 
80. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 365, 395 (1992). 
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is specified in the statute.81  In most of the states, adoption has fol­
lowed a pattern set forth in Kemp & Beatley where the court recog­
nizes a decision normally within the authority of directors and the 
majority under corporate law will, in a close corporation, often frus­
trate the expectation of investors in entering into the enterprise.82 
Although there were oppression statutes in many states at the time 
of Donahue, the continuing spread of these statutes after Donahue 
and the willingness to incorporate reasonable expectations as the 
touchstone has made the statute an effective remedy for 
oppression.83 
(3) Also important to the effective development of the oppres­
sion remedy was the development of a consensus that a buyout was 
the appropriate remedy when oppression had been shown.  Again 
this was a combined result of legislative changes and judicial inter­
pretations reflecting the legislative purpose in providing a judicial 
remedy that Kemp & Beatley recognized.  In some states, a buyout 
is authorized by statute.84  In other states, courts have used their 
general remedial power to order a buyout.85  But the result is that 
there is specific authority for buyouts in half of the states.86  The 
move to buyouts can be seen in comparing two empirical studies on 
either side of Wilkes.  In a study of the 1960-1976 period, Professors 
Hetherington and Dooley, surveying fifty-four involuntary dissolu­
tion cases in the sixteen years that mostly preceded Wilkes, found 
no relief in half of the cases, involuntary dissolution in sixteen, 
81. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1­
115 (2009). 
82. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND 
LLC MEMBER, supra note 77, § 7:13. R 
83. See supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-43 for a discus- R 
sion of the spread of oppression statutes.  New York itself did not have an oppression 
statute at the time of Donahue and Wilkes, see 1979 N.Y. Laws, c. 217, § 1 (adding 
§ 1104-a) so that the New York statute and the broad interpretation of the statute in 
Kemp & Beatley illustrates this trend. 
84. Often this buyout is at the option of the majority shareholder after a minority 
has petitioned for dissolution. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 2003); 
MODEL  BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 14.34 (4th ed. 2008).  In other states, statutes list 
buyout among various possible remedies. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West 
2003). 
85. See e.g., Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983). See generally 
O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  OPPRESSION OF  MINORITY  SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEM­
BER, supra note 77, § 7:19. R 
86. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 
31, § 9:18. R 
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buyouts in three, and other relief in four.87  When Professor Hayn­
sworth performed a similar study in the 1984-1985 period, there had 
been a significant increase in the number of cases and a dramatic 
shift with buyouts in twenty cases (of the thirty-seven cases), invol­
untary dissolution in ten, and no relief only in four.88 
(4) Minority shareholders seeking to enforce fiduciary duties 
are usually permitted to bring a direct individual action as opposed 
to derivative claim in the name of, and on behalf of, the corpora­
tion.89  The result is to expand the possibility of relief and again to 
focus courts on the relationship within the close corporation. Courts 
permit direct relief where the only interested parties are two indi­
viduals or sets of shareholders—one who is in control and the other 
who is not; other courts analogize a small corporation, to a partner­
ship where direct claims are permitted; still others observe that a 
derivative claim is unnecessary where only the complaining share­
holder is disadvantaged by the actions taken by the majority.90  The 
American Law Institute’s adoption of a direct cause of action in a 
closely held corporation has spurred judicial movement in this 
direction.91 
(5) Since Donahue and Wilkes, courts have continued to hold 
that majority shareholders in a close corporation have an enhanced 
fiduciary duty so as to provide relief to minority shareholders in a 
close corporation after a falling out among the parties.92  There 
have been contrary holdings by some courts refusing to apply an 
equal opportunity right in particular contexts.93  Delaware has put 
it in broader terms of preferring contractual solutions to judicial 
ones: “Tools of good corporate [governance] are designed to give a 
87. John A.C. Hetherington & Michael Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A 
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 63-75 (1977). 
88. Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a 
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 50-53 (1987). 
89. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND 
LLC MEMBER, supra note 77, § 7:08 (collecting direct causes of action in an oppression R 
setting). 
90. See id. § 7:07 (describing different reasons courts have given for permitting 
direct individual causes of action). 
91. PRINCIPLES OF  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND  RECOMMENDA­
TIONS § 7.01(d) (1994). 
92. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 
31, § 9:18 (providing chart for cases in individual states). R 
93. Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 654 (Md. Ct. App. 1985); 
Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Dela­
houssaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
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purchasing minority stockholder [an] opportunity to bargain for 
protection before parting with consideration.  It would do violence 
to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion” a 
judicial remedy for which the parties had not contracted.94  But as a 
Utah court recently put it, “the Delaware approach . . . stands in 
sharp contrast to the fiduciary duty standard followed by the major­
ity of states.”95  A number of states follow Massachusetts in analo­
gizing to the fiduciary duties of partners.96 
The statutory oppression remedy and the common law en­
hanced fiduciary duty action are complimentary and sometimes ef­
fectively substitutes.97  A Massachusetts court held, for example, 
“[t]he standards used to determine a breach of fiduciary duty are 
often the same used to define oppression.”98  Many courts have de­
fined oppression by reference to reasonable expectations or fiduci­
ary duty.99  Given this development, it makes little sense to 
consider enhanced fiduciary duty by itself rather than part of an 
shareholder’s cause of action for oppression in which the statutory 
standard in the more common illustration.  Practically, the en­
hanced fiduciary duty doctrine fills a gap in the coverage of oppres­
sion in that three of the eleven states that do not have an 
oppression statute—Massachusetts,100 Ohio,101 and Indiana102—use 
an enhanced fiduciary duty to provide relief to a minority share­
holder facing the closely held corporation predicament as the over­
lap in the excerpts from Donahue and Kemp & Beatley illustrate.103 
94. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993). 
95. McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 155 (Utah 2009). 
96. See River Mgmt. Corp. v. Lodge Props., Inc., 829 P.2d 398, 401 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1991); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E. 2d 712, 716 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); Fought v. 
Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 170-71 (Miss. 1989); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1992); A. Teixeira & Co., Inc. v. Teixeira, 699 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (R.I. 1997). 
97. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 700. R 
98. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 n.3 (Mass. 2006). 
99. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting that oppressive conduct of those in control is closely related to breach of 
fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders). See generally O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 31, § 9:27. R 
100. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
101. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) (noting that the majority 
used its controlling position for personal enrichment depriving the plaintiff of the bene­
fit of his investment and the opportunity to share in corporate profits). 
102. G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E. 2d 227, 243 (Ind. 2001) (permitting 
court to order buyout for breach of fiduciary duty); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor 
Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E. 2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1998) (“Courts have traditionally interpreted 
fiduciary dut[y] differently for closely-held corporations as opposed to publicly held 
corporations for which most of . . . statutory norms were established.”). 
103. See supra notes 59-83 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, only Delaware, Florida, and a half dozen of our smaller 
states lack either statutory or judicial authority for providing a judi­
cial means to prevent the corporate attributes of centralized con­
trol/majority rule and entity permanence from being used to 
frustrate the reasonable expectations of participants in a closely 
held business.104 
The overall result is that a remarkable consensus has devel­
oped in the years since Donahue and Wilkes that the predicament 
or plight of minority investors in a closely held business warrants 
the possibility (but not the requirement) of judicial review to pro­
vide liquidity where the minority investor is receiving no money in 
contradiction of the parties’ expectations in the venture.105  This 
consensus has arisen in spite of a decades-long reform tradition ex­
panding the room for contracting in the closely held firm.  Harry 
Henn, writer of a widely-used corporations’ treatise of the period, 
noted that “drafting . . . enabled close corporations to achieve most 
of their legitimate object[ives] thereby rendering the present situa­
tion tolerable.”106  Changes made to the Model Act in the early 
1990s were in some ways the culmination of the contracting evolu­
tion within close corporations.  The annotation to section 7.32 notes 
that the provision legitimizes all of the agreements that planners of 
a close corporation would want.107  But the five developments out­
lined above have continued.  Henn’s conclusion that the situation 
was tolerable has turned out not to be widely accepted given the 
close corporation predicament.  Even the sophisticated contracting 
envisioned by section 7.32 of the Model Act has not removed the 
need for a judicially-provided route around permanence for those 
who have made an investment in the closely held firm when there 
later occurs a falling out among participants and corporate govern­
ance permits one set of participants to make decisions for what had 
been a shared enterprise. 
104. And that list is narrowed further by various holdings even in those states. 
See, e.g., Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *8 (Del. Ct. Ch. Feb. 11, 1992) 
(using reasonable expectations to determine breach of fiduciary duty); Donofrio v. 
Matassini, 503 So. 2d 1278, 1281-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Richards v. Bryan, 879 
P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Beard v. Love, 173 P.3d 796, 804-05 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2007) (allowing for dissolution in a case involving oppression). 
105. See Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 383 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (ordering 
buy-out of interest owned by minority shareholder at fair market value); Duncan v. 
Lichtenberger, 671 S.W.2d 948, 953-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming jury verdict 
awarding damages to two minority shareholders who were not receiving compensation). 
106. HARRY HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 512 (2d ed. 1970). 
107. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 7.32(a) (4th ed. 2008). 
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II. DONAHUE/WILKES APPLICATION TO LLCS IN THE
 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
 
Longevity for a judicial opinion in terms of its impact on the 
law turns not just on how it turned heads at the time it was handed 
down, but also on its application to new situations so that successive 
generations of judges and lawyers believe the principles of the case 
remain useful in addressing evolving contexts that arise. The LLC 
provides an opportunity to make such an evaluation as to the last­
ing impact of Donahue and Wilkes.  This Part considers the begin­
nings of LLCs in the late 1970s and their rapid growth which 
occurred in the early 1990s.  Part B then asks if investors in LLCs 
face the same or similar predicament as those in close corporations. 
Part C returns to the legal responses to the predicament of the mi­
nority investor in a closely held firm considered in Part I and asks 
how they would apply in the LLC context.  Part D then looks at 
data on where LLCs organize to suggest Delaware is appealing to a 
specific segment of the LLC market where contracting may be 
more efficient and more likely to be used. 
A. The Origins of LLCs 
The early history of LLCs in America is a now familiar story 
(and entirely postdates Donahue and Wilkes).  The Wyoming and 
then Florida legislatures passed the initial statutes, but there really 
could not be any significant use of the form until the IRS blessed 
LLCs as providing pass-through taxation.108  The initial IRS ap­
proval turned on the Kintner factors requiring an entity seeking 
non-corporate tax status to have a majority of non-corporate attrib­
utes, using attributes similar to the ones discussed at the beginning 
of this article.109  Given the requirements of Kintner, investors de­
siring the corporate factor of limited liability, needed to avoid the 
other named corporate factors of centralized control, continuity of 
108. See generally LARRY RIBSTEIN & ROBERT KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEAT­
INGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (3d ed. 2004). 
109. The factors take their name from a 1954 appellate opinion, United States v. 
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).  The case involved a context in which the private 
planners sought to be a corporation given the historical tax advantages discussed above. 
To do so, the court in Kitner said an enterprise must have at least three of the four 
named corporate characteristics Id. at 422-24.  As the changes in the tax law moved 
toward leading parties more often to seek non-corporate or pass-through tax treatment, 
the same approach continued to be used, even though the parties essentially had 
swapped positions. See generally Thompson, supra note 8, at 931. R 
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life, and free transferability of interest.110  As a result, early LLC 
statutes provided these non-corporate features, even put in a bullet­
proof format in various states.  Then, in the mid-1990s, the IRS 
changed positions, withdrew from refereeing which non-corporate 
entities could get pass-through tax status and which could not, and 
left it to the choice of the planners through a “check the box” provi­
sion.111  Thereafter, most states changed their LLC statutes to pro­
vide more in the way of centralized control and certainly more in 
the way of entity permanence since those changes would no longer 
endanger the entity’s pass-through tax status.112  LLCs are now the 
most-used legal form for the closely held business.113 
There are multiple possible explanations for this story. Profes­
sor Larry Ribstein, who rightfully deserves a central place in ex­
plaining LLCs, describes the move in his contribution to this 
Symposium as “freeing small firms to adopt standard forms that 
suited their needs.”114  I think it is more likely that LLCs grew ini­
tially because a small subset of investors were not able to gain their 
preferred answers to the three questions that are bundled when one 
chooses a particular legal form of business. The three basic ques­
tions for which participants seek answers in choosing the legal form 
within which to organize, previously discussed in Part I, are: (1) a 
favorable legal rule in their relationship toward outsiders who deal 
with the business (limited liability); (2) a favorable legal rule in 
their relationship with government (lower taxes); and (3) satisfac­
tory rules in the relationships with co-venturers.  Since the three 
questions are bundled within the choice of business form decision 
there is the possibility of having to trade off disadvantages or uncer­
tainty in one area to gain more beneficial advantages or certainty in 
110. An entity could not have more than two corporate characteristics and still 
get non-corporate tax treatment. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to 3T (1994) (repealed 
1996). 
111. See Treas. Reg. § 301.770-1 (effective Jan. 1, 1997). 
112. O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 31, R 
ch. 5. 
113. Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New Kings of the Hill: An Empirical 
Study of the Number of LLCs, Corporations, and LLPs Formed in the United States 
Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM. 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459-60 (2010) (reporting LLCs outpace corporations in most 
states; overall by a 2-1 margin). 
114. Larry Ribstein, Escaping the Nursing Home: Contracts in LLCs and Close 
Corporations, W. NEW ENG. L. & BUS. CTR., Annual Conference 2010: Fiduciary Duties 
in Closely Held Firms 35 Years after Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., http:// 
web7.streamhoster.com/wnecvideo/law/law_and_business//panel4_2010.html (last vis­
ited Apr. 7, 2011). 
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other areas.  As noted in the previous part, my view is that if there 
is any conflict among the three areas, the first two questions almost 
always dominate the third in the choice of business firms.  Limited 
liability and lower taxes usually are seen as providing a real and 
immediate benefit.  Governance rules of centralized control and 
permanence may not be the best fit for a closely held business, but 
possible disadvantages are likely to be seen as uncertain and dis­
tant.  Participants do not think (or do not want to contemplate) that 
their relationship will falter, and if it they do think about it, they 
assume, perhaps naively, that they can deal with it. 
At the time that LLCs were created there were some investors 
who could not achieve the favorable bundle of limited liability, 
pass-through-tax treatment, and satisfactory governance.115  For ex­
ample, in the 1980s, income tax changes removed what had been 
the benefit of having corporate level tax.116  While subchapter S 
permitted most small corporations to choose to have pass-through 
tax treatment, there were a few tax breaks in real estate or oil and 
gas that could only be achieved outside of subchapter S.117  Since 
limited liability was essentially only available in the corporate form, 
these firms could not get both limited liability and the lowest tax 
treatment within the same business structure.  Perhaps more impor­
tant to the spreading adoption of LLCs was a second group that 
could not get the favorable combination.  Professional firms, such 
as accountants, traditionally had been restricted in their ability to 
incorporate and thereby gain limited liability.118  The professional 
incorporation statutes that had been passed by many states in the 
mid-twentieth century did not permit the same degree of liability­
115. See Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests 
Should Not Be Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this Result, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1282 (1994); Park McGinty, The Limited Liability Company: Op­
portunity for Selective Securities Law Deregulation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 369, 425 (1996). 
116. Until 1982, the highest individual tax rate always exceeded the highest cor­
porate tax rate. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL  TAX  POLICY 299-305 (5th ed. 
1987).  For example, in 1942, the highest individual rate was 88% while the rate in the 
top corporate bracket was 40%, id. at 313, 321, creating an incentive to use the corpo­
rate form if a double tax could be avoided when the corporate earnings were distributed 
to participants and if other tax provisions (for example, basis rules, deductions, exemp­
tions) did not eliminate the advantage from the rate differential. Tax reform in 1986 
ended the General Utilities doctrine, which was a principal method of avoiding a 
double tax for businesses using the corporate form. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. 99-514,  § 631, 100 Stat. 2269, 2269-75 (1986) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.  § 
337 (2006)). 
117. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 
31, at § 2:9. R 
118. Id. 
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shielding as in a traditional corporation.119  LLC statutes offered a 
way to achieve a more accommodating limited liability rule in the 
professions. 
B.	 Do Investors in LLCs Share the Predicament Identified in 
Donahue/Wilkes? 
Do minority investors in LLCs find themselves in the same 
predicament or trap that motivated the Massachusetts court to act 
in Donahue and Wilkes?  As a first cut, the LLC shares with the 
traditional close corporation the characteristics of intimacy and illi­
quidity that are at the heart of the oppression analysis.  LLCs are 
usually relationships among a very small set of participants, often 
linked by family or close personal ties.120  As with close corpora­
tions, the participants often play multiple roles in the enterprise. 
They provide the necessary capital and the management; they look 
to the enterprise not just for a return on their investment, but also 
for a job.  It is a greater part of their life than the publicly-held 
enterprise is to the participants in that entity.  Being cut-off from 
the LLC will disrupt a relationship that is more intimate and in­
tense than in a publicly-held company. 
Like investors in close corporations, investors in a LLC have 
no market for their interests.  This illiquidity means that if, because 
of a death, disability, or change of position in life, they need to get 
cash for their investment, they cannot look to the market for liquid­
ity as can investors in a public corporation.  And, if they are forced 
out by the other participants, they may be left with little or no re­
turn on what they have put into the business. 
In the initial LLCs (those formed under a statute that existed 
prior to “check the box”), this risk was considerably less than for 
investors in a minority position in a close corporation.121  In order 
to gain the favorable pass-through tax treatment LLCs had to pro­
vide for easy-exit, shared governance, and not provide entity per­
manence.122  These mandatory rules reduced the likelihood of the 
119.	 Id. 
120. But not always—it is possible to be a publicly held LLC even if there may be 
corporate-type taxation. See generally Kahn v. Portnoy, No. 3515-CC2, 2008 WL 
5197164 (Del Ch. Dec. 11, 2008). 
121. Check the box refers to the IRS choice to permit unincorporated entities to 
choose whether they want to be taxed as individuals or corporations. See Simplification 
of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 301). 
122. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 418 (9th Cir. 1954). See generally 
Thompson, supra note 8, at 931. R 
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Donahue/Wilkes predicament.  After “check the box,” state legisla­
tures launched a widespread reformulation of their LLC statutes.123 
It became common to provide for manager-managed LLCs as well 
as a member-managed format.124  Some statutes even provided for 
officers and directors so that even the labels would mimic the cor­
poration.125  Even more relevant for this discussion, almost all the 
states changed their rules about easy exit to remove a participant’s 
ability to end the relationship on terms that would provide anything 
more than being able to assign the income stream.126  This move 
back toward permanence was itself driven by tax concerns; not the 
income tax concerns that had driven the early LLC movement, but 
the estate tax worries.127  It turns out that the best way to keep 
valuation down for estate tax is to be able to point to restrictions on 
getting out, which will reduce the value.128  Again, the possibility of 
getting a definite tax advantage in the foreseeable future trumps the 
less accessible possibility of being disadvantaged if there were to be 
a falling out among the participants. 
Going back to the menu of possible responses to this predica­
ment or trap, the preferred solution for many in the LLC discussion 
is private contracting.  Turning again to Professor Ribstein’s contri­
bution to this Symposium, note the optimism permeating the LLC 
form as opposed to the close corporation of an earlier day: “Wilkes 
123. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: 
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 932­
33 (2005) (“[F]ollowing the passage of the ‘check-the-box’ regulations, there was no 
longer a tax-driven need for state statutes to deny the LLC certain corporate character­
istics.  In response, many state legislatures eliminated or restricted the withdrawal and 
dissolution rights that had served to combat a continuity of life finding.”). 
124. REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 407 (2006), availa­
ble at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.pdf; DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005). 
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West 2004) (manager-managed as 
the default governance in LLC). 
126. Note the changes in Delaware law made in 1996.  Prior to 1996, its LLC 
statute provided that, unless otherwise provided, a member had the right to resign upon 
giving six months notice and then the right to receive, within a reasonable time, the fair 
value of the member’s ownership interest. 1992 Delaware Laws Ch. 434 (H.B. 608). 
Effective in 1996, the default rule flipped and now provides that a member can resign 
only as set out in the operating agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-603 (2005). The 
change thus flips which party needs to worry more about working out an agreement. 
A departing party who before had protection even if the agreement was silent now is 
locked-in unless alternative provisions are put into the agreement. 
127. 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2006). 
128. 26 U.S.C. § 2703; Treasury Reg. § 20.2031-1 & 2 (as amended in 1965). See 
generally O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 31, 
§ 7:49. 
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and similar close corporation cases are the product of an earlier 
time when closely held firms lacked sophistication and coherent 
contracting technology and therefore needed significant judicial as­
sistance to fill the significant gaps in their contracts.”129  The sug­
gestion is that the trap is a relic of the past that investors are now 
able to use “sophisticated and coherent contracting technology.”130 
This approach recognizes that parties “need” to address allowing 
members to exit via buyout or dissolution, and even more, assumes 
they will do so successfully. 
Think again about the world before Donahue/Wilkes and con­
template the belief in contracts that motivated those early pio­
neers—vetoes, agreements to arbitrate and the rest (with little 
reliance on fiduciary duty).131  Although courts in LLC cases regu­
larly refer to the purpose of the statute as to give maximum effect 
of freedom of contract,132 maximizing contracting is also a principal 
purpose of corporations statues in general and provisions relevant 
to close corporations in particular. For decades, corporations stat­
utes have been referred to as enabling statutes, which, of course, 
means deferring to the parties’ contracts.133  For close corporations 
in particular, section 7.32 of the Model Business Corporation Act is 
intended to cover all the key contracts that a planner would want to 
use in close corporations.134  There are some differences with LLCs, 
principally in the ability of the parties to contract around fiduciary 
duty or involuntary dissolution statutes, but the difference is not as 
great as the language of some courts and commentators might lead 
you to believe. 
Consider also the continuing bounded rationality problems of 
investors in the closely held firm and the extent to which more im­
mediate tax motivations still dominate decision-making.135  The 
choice is not unlike what faced the Massachusetts courts at the time 
129. Ribstein, supra note 114. R 
130. Id. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28. R 
132. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999). 
133. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991) (“The corporate code in almost every state is 
an ‘enabling’ statute.  An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their 
own tickets, to establish systems of governance without scrutiny from a regulator.”). 
134. MODEL  BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2005) (see official comment) (“Section 
7.32(a) validates virtually all types of shareholder agreements that, in practice, normally 
concern shareholders or their advisors.”). 
135. The sticky defaults discussed in Deborah DeMott’s contribution to this Sym­
posium is an example.  Deborah A. Demott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employ­
ment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497 (2011). 
397 
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of Donahue and Wilkes—is there a benefit to having a vehicle for 
judges to provide liquidity when there has been a falling out among 
the parties and the rules chosen for tax reasons have an unexpected 
result of permitting those in the majority to continue using the mi­
nority’s money for an indefinite period? 
C. Involuntary Dissolution Statutes for LLCs 
As they have been in close corporations, involuntary dissolu­
tion statutes have been the dominant means for working out the 
extent to which there should be a role for courts in providing liquid­
ity when there has been a falling out among the parties and one 
party is left locked into, or squeezed out of, the entity.  LLC invol­
untary dissolution statutes primarily come in two flavors.  Almost 
all states permit a court, in its discretion, to order dissolution when 
it is “not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in con­
formity with the articles of organization or operating agree­
ment.”136  That language itself has been used to order dissolution in 
many cases where the parties cannot get along, such as in a two-
person entity where there is evidence of a breakdown in the rela­
tionship between the parties.137  The cases include patterns that will 
be familiar to readers of close corporations cases—where one mem­
ber locked the other out,138 where there was a history of bad blood 
between the parties,139 where there was no communication between 
the parties,140 and where the parties had combined not speaking 
136. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 44 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109, § 45. 
Only a handful of states do not include such a provision. See ALASKA  STAT. 
§ 10.50.400, 405 (2010) (impossible for the company to carry on the purposes of the 
company).  The other states omitting “not reasonably practicable” do provide for disso­
lution upon deadlock. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 117 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 322B.833 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:51 (West 2005); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-6-02 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119 (2005). 
137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
138. Connors v. Howe Elegant, LLC, No. 4003783, 2009 WL 242324, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Jan. 8, 2009) (holding it to be no longer reasonably practicable to carry on busi­
ness when one of the two 50/50 partners shut the other partner out of the business and 
transferred all funds out of the LLC account). 
139. Lindsay v. Pacific Topsoils, Inc., No. 50558-1-1, 2003 WL 22121055, at *18 
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2003) (holding that substantial “history . . . of bad blood” 
shown in the lower court was enough to show that it was no longer reasonably practica­
ble to carry on business). 
140. Polak v. Kobayashi, No. 05-330-SLF, 2008 WL 4905519, at *5 (D. Del. Nov. 
13, 2008) (ordering judicial dissolution where two 50/50 partners no longer communi­
cated and each were acting to the detriment of the other). 
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with multiple lawsuits.141  Similar reasoning has been extended to a 
three person entity divided equally between two sides.142  Where 
one of the two 50% owners made unilateral arrangements to the 
detriment of the LLC and the other owner leading to a cessation of 
a business or personal relationship, and the sole asset no longer ex­
isted, the court ordered dissolution under a “not reasonably practi­
cable” standard.143 
Note that these are cases where there were gaps in the operat­
ing agreement despite the sophisticated and the coherent con­
tracting technology available to them.144  Courts do refer to the 
operating agreement in deciding whether judicial intervention is ap­
propriate. Thus, a court defined the statutory standard by reference 
to the purpose clause of the agreement.145  Judicial relief has been 
ordered under the “not reasonably practicable” standard due to 
where the operating agreement left the parties.146  A Louisiana 
court pointed to provisions that permitted one member to fire an­
other, but then permitted the other members to rehire the fired 
member, and another provision by which any member could assign 
a portion of an interest to a spouse and thereby become immune 
from expulsion by unanimous vote.147 
About one third of the states use statutory language that tracks 
the close corporation approach to involuntary dissolution based on 
oppressive acts toward the minority or similar language.148  Thus, 
eleven states use oppressive acts as the trigger (either alone or in 
141. Weinmann v. Duhon, 818 So. 2d 206, 209 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing dis­
solution where there were two members representing forty percent of the company who 
had differing ideas of how the LLC should be run and where there was no alternative 
method for dissolution in the operating agreement). 
142. In re Silver Leaf, LLC, No. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641, at *1, *12 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 18, 2005) (ordering dissolution but refusing to name participant as receiver; court 
said evidence indicated that business was simply a penny stock fraud). 
143. Saunders v. Firtel, 978 A.2d 487, 499 (Conn. 2009) (affirmed dissolution of 
the LLC where one of the two 50/50 members acted to the detriment of the LLC and to 
the other member). 
144. See, e.g., Weinmann, 818 So.2d at 209; Saunders, 978 A.2d at 499; Connors v. 
Howe Elegant, LLC, No. 4003783, 2009 WL 242324, at *1 (Conn. Super. Jan. 8, 2009). 
145. In re Seneca Investments, LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (failure to 
make distributions along with other operating agreement violations was not enough for 
judicial dissolution). 
146. In re Silver Leaf, 2005 WL 2045641, at *11 (noting that “[g]iven [the LLC’s] 
ownership structure and Operating Agreement, Silver Leaf is no longer able to carry on 
its business in a reasonably practicable manner”). 
147. Weinmann, 818 So. 2d at 210 (judicial dissolution is appropriate where both 
50/50 owners express their wishes to no longer continue business with one another). 
148. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-801 (LexisNexis 2008) (oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial conduct, not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s busi­
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combination with “unfairly prejudicial” or “not reasonably practi­
cable”), incorporating the term that is found in the corporations 
statutes in the great majority of states.149  Two more use “unfairly 
prejudicial” language that grew out of the involuntary dissolution 
context in the corporate setting, usually intended to expand the 
reach of judicial action.150  Two other states use “necessary . . . [to 
protect] . . . the rights or interests of . . . complaining member[s]” 
which also has precedent in the corporate area.151  South Dakota in 
2009 moved to the revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
language of “not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
business with that member,” which suggests a focus on the major­
ity’s relationship with the minority member.152  While there has 
been some movement toward including a buyout at the request of 
the majority shareholder as part of involuntary dissolution statutes 
for LLCs, as has already occurred with close corporations,153 the 
use of this type of provision is not as widespread as in the corporate 
statutes.154 
As a South Dakota case makes clear, the language permits dis­
solution even where the business could continue despite the parties’ 
disagreement and deadlock.155  The facts of a Wisconsin case sug­
gest how a capital call that is not needed could be oppressive.156 
ness with that member); IDAHO CODE § 30-6-70(e) (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/ 
35-1 (West 2006). 
149. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-801; IDAHO  CODE § 30-6-70(e); 805 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/35-1. 
150. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833(2)(ii) (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE  ANN. 
§ 10-32-119(b)(2) (2005). 
151. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(a)(2) (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C­
6-02(2) (2009). 
152. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-8014(ii) (2007). 
153. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(b)(1);  Dickson v. Rehmke, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 
879-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (alternative decree issued by the court allowing members to 
purchase minority interest in order to avoid dissolution). 
154. Provisions in one operating agreement permitting majority interests to over­
come dissolution got lost in a tangle of convoluted definitions of similar terms. Ruth v. 
Home Health Care of Middle Tenn., LLC, No. E2009-00845-COA-R3_CV, 2010 WL 
744936, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2010) (ambiguous operating agreement gets past 
summary judgment to show whether dissolution is allowed). 
155. Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 825, 832 (S.D. 2008) (Meierhenry, J., con­
curring) (stalemate can lead to judicial dissolution, as there are few other available 
alternatives to handle the deadlock). 
156. See generally Lynch v. Carriage Ridge, LLC, 668 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. App. 
2003) (judicial dissolution was not appropriate in situation where there was an accusa­
tion of a breach of the operating agreement). 
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Another case found dissolution provided by the operating agree­
ment to be triggered by a member’s bad faith offer.157 
Other triggers for involuntary dissolution under LLC statutes 
include deadlock in eight states158 and broad generic equitable 
grounds in two states.159  In general, LLCs are starting from a posi­
tion where the law is more open to a judge being able to grant dis­
solution than was true for corporations law a half-century ago, but 
not as far along as corporate law has moved currently, where there 
is legislative or judicial authority for judicial relief after oppressive 
acts in all by a handful of states.160 
D. The Role of Contracts in LLCs 
While I suggest limits on the willingness to accept the perfec­
tion of contracts, or their relative attractiveness as to gap-filling, 
this is not to say that there are not differences in sophistication and 
ability to use contracts.  Indeed, the beginning of a segmentation of 
the market can be seen in the pattern of LLC usage.  Compare Del­
aware’s share of the LLC market to its share of the market for pub­
lic corporations and for close corporations generally.  Its share of 
the public corporation market approaches 60% and it takes 85% or 
more of the market for public corporations that incorporate outside 
their headquarters state.161  For close corporations, its share is 
above its percentage of the national population, but still in the low 
single digits of the national market.162  For LLCs, it is in between— 
157. Decker v. Decker, 726 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (judicial disso­
lution is upheld when triggered by an offer made in bad faith). 
158. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A)(2) (1998); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 17351(a)(4); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,117(b) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 322B.833(2)(i) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:51(VI) (2005); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 576-6-02(2)(i) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 48-2c-1210(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010). 
159. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-901, 902 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.275 
(West 2005). 
160. The discussion above draws on Chapter 5 of F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT 
B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S  CLOSE  CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND 
PRACTICE Chapter 5 (Rev. 3d ed. 2010). 
161. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incor­
porate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 386 (2003). 
162. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, The Incorporation Choices of Pri­
vately Held Corporations, SOC. SCIENCE  RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1049581 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
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at the very top among the states, but overall with a market share 
just below double digits.163 
Empirical work by Jens Dammann and Matthias Schundeln in­
dicates that Delaware does much better in attracting LLCs (and 
close corporations) that organize outside the state of their principal 
place of business.164  As to those entities with the largest numbers 
of employees, Delaware’s share of firms organized under its laws 
gets close to its share of public corporations that organize outside of 
their principal place of business.165  Dammann & Schundeln suggest 
LLCs are more likely to flee for states with more lax governance 
structure (measured by duty of care standards and if the majority 
can dissolve the corporation).166  Kobayashi and Ribstein, develop­
ing a similar data set, find no relation of substantive provisions of 
the law of the organizing state and that firms moving from a low 
quality state tend to move to another low quality state.167  Both 
studies rely on the number of employees as a proxy for size since 
neither had access to the number of owners, a size metric more 
likely to make a difference for LLC governance provisions. 
In the absence of such ownership data, Delaware LLC cases 
provide some anecdotal data suggesting Delaware’s attractiveness 
to a specific subset of the closely held entity marketplace.168  There 
appears to be a pattern of sophisticated investors willing to plan 
beyond the statutory default rules and willing to pay for such plan­
ning.  If this is so, it is not surprising that Delaware is more willing 
to permit members to contract around the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
and waive the right to petition a court for dissolution.169 
163. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, Where are Limited Liability Compa­
nies Formed? An Empirical Analysis, SOC. SCIENCE  RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1126257 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
164. Id. at 9. 
165. Id.  A much smaller percentage of LLCs organize outside of their principal 
place of business so that Delaware’s overall share of LLCs is lower than its 60% or so 
share of publicly-held corporations. 
166. Id. at 19. 
167. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdic­
tional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1431989 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
168. See, e.g., In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259 (Del. Ch. 2008); R & 
R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 
3846318 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
169. CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASE AND MATERIALS 538 (6th ed. 2010). 
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But even in Delaware, its sophisticated judiciary is more than 
willing to use fiduciary duty and involuntary dissolution.170  In a 
Delaware case where there was deadlock at the board level and no 
means around deadlock because of terms intentionally included in 
the operating agreement, Chancellor Chandler refused to use fidu­
ciary duty to cabin how the parties used their veto power, but nev­
ertheless was willing to order dissolution.171  Even where an 
agreement provides for an exit mechanism, Vice-Chancellor Strine 
ordered dissolution under the statutory “not reasonably practica­
ble” standard because the agreement’s mechanism did not relieve 
one of the two 50% members of his obligation as a personal guaran­
tor for the LLC mortgage.172  “With no reasonable exit mechanism” 
the court found the member could “exercise the only practical 
deadlock-breaking remedy available to him, and one that is also 
alluded to in the LLC agreement, the right to seek judicial 
dissolution.”173 
CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cases of thirty-five 
years ago merit the place at the center of this Symposium, both for 
how they changed the law of the closely held firm in the 1970s and 
what they can tell us about limited liability companies in the 
twenty-first century.  Their greatness, however, is not necessarily as 
often surmised.  Fiduciary duty, partnership attributes, and equal 
opportunity remain part of the legacy, but as the law has evolved in 
the time since, oppression, reasonable expectations, and buyouts 
have taken a more prominent role. Donahue and Wilkes excelled 
at defining the problem that gave rise to a variety of possible solu­
tions that are still developing.  The predicament of the investor in 
the closely held business, so clearly set out in Donahue and refined 
in Wilkes, thus moved from the academy and some British decisions 
into the mainstream of American law where it has remained ever 
since. 
170. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957, at *7 (Del Ch. 
Jan. 13, 2009). 
171. Id. at *4-7 (dissolution is appropriate where there is a deadlock without any 
mechanism in the operating agreement to circumvent the stalemate). 
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2006); Haley, 864 A.2d at 94-98. 
173. Haley, 864 A.2d at 88-89 (footnote omitted); see also Connors v. Howe Ele­
gant, LLC, No. 4003783, 2009 WL 242324, at *13 (Conn. Super. Jan. 8, 2009) (following 
Haley, forcing member to exercise contractual exit would not permit LLC to proceed in 
a practicable way). 
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In recent years limited liability company law has grown dra­
matically, but there remain recurring parallels to how the law of 
close corporations developed over the twentieth century.  In close 
corporations law, the initial hostility to carving out different rules, 
or even to enforcing agreements that parties made for their own 
governance, gave way to a widespread acceptance of freedom of 
contract.  But even then, as illustrated in Donahue and Wilkes, 
courts recognized that there was a need to provide a judicial fail-
safe where the parties’ planning left gaps that would defeat parties’ 
expectations in entering into the legal relationship.  In recognizing a 
role for involuntary dissolution based on oppression and a greater 
recognition of fiduciary duty than was apparent twenty years ago, 
LLC law is following in the path of the development of close corpo­
ration law.  In that journey, too, Donahue and Wilkes provide gui­
dance.  There will remain differences over the relative roles of 
contracts and judges, and that line may divide differently for differ­
ent types of LLCs, but the question that the Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court confronted in Donahue and Wilkes will 
continue to require both judicial attention and that of the partici­
pants in their contracts. 
